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were in many cases not keen to leave
their families and jobs to serve in an undeclared “police action.”
In addition, Crane recognizes, the Air
Force was challenged by interservice rivalry with the Army and the misunderstanding of its role in battlefield air
interdiction, and to a lesser degree by
negative perceptions created by strategic
bombing at the expense of close air support for the Army. He points out that the
frustration felt by Army commanders
was exacerbated by the effective and dedicated close-air support provided to the
Marines by their air component. The
Army continually questioned why the Air
Force could not provide for it the same
level of effective support.
Crane also rightly recognizes the effective
leadership and operational genius of the
Far East Air Forces (FEAF) planner, Brigadier General Jacob Smart, who was able
to produce a coherent interdiction strategy which he skillfully “sold” to the
Army. Smart recognized the difficulty of
conducting tactical interdiction operations against an entrenched enemy who
did not require much in the way of supply. He reoriented FEAF’s interdiction efforts away from cutting tactical lines of
communications to striking such operational targets as hydroelectric facilities,
supply distribution centers, and other
“deep” targets, all with some effect.
Crane’s book is a valuable compilation of
the contributions of the Air Force in the
prosecution of the Korean War. Crane
reveals the warts but also gives glowing
credit where it is due. Much more than a
mere chronology, this is an insightful
book that is a must-read for critical students of this conflict.
WILFRED F. BROWN

Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
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For thirty years after the Second World
War, historians said very little about the
role of signals intelligence in the Battle of
the Atlantic—because either they did not
know about the Allies’ remarkable
code-breaking successes, or they could
not write about what they did know.
That changed in 1974, when revelations
about ULTRA exposed the full extent of
the Allied penetration of Germany’s signals. Unfortunately, in the subsequent
rush to rewrite the history books to include ULTRA, its significance was frequently inflated.
In this study of ULTRA and the Battle of
the Atlantic, Gardner offers the most
fully developed case yet that monocausal
explanations for the Allied victory in this
campaign are inadequate—that ULTRA
was only one critical factor among many.
Gardner provides two case studies to
support his argument. The first demonstrates that Britain’s growing ascendancy
over the U-boat in 1941 had many causes,
most of which were unconnected with
ULTRA. Just as important as code breaking, if not more so, was the tightening up
of the convoy system and the German
decision to shift U-boat operations westward in order to avoid the increasingly
hostile environment around the British
Isles. The greater availability of escort
vessels and growing American assistance
also played an important part in turning
the tide in Britain’s favor in 1941. It is
therefore a mistake to suggest, as some
have done, that ULTRA alone may have
saved as much as two million tons of
shipping during this period.
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Gardner’s second case study covers the
period from mid-1942 to mid-1943, the
final turning point in the campaign.
Once again, he makes a strong argument
that factors other than ULTRA were essential for the Allies’ success, most importantly the closing of the mid-Atlantic
“air gap” and the increasing number and
effectiveness of Allied escort vessels. By
1943, Gardner notes, it was more hazardous than ever for the Germans to attack
convoys. At the same time, the growing
number of U-boats operating in the
mid-Atlantic made the evasive routing of
convoys extremely difficult for the Allies,
even when ULTRA was available on a
timely basis.
These case studies cover periods when
ULTRA was most valuable because Germany was employing its U-boats in “wolf
pack” attacks on convoys. When U-boats
operated individually rather than in
groups, which was the case for nearly
two-thirds of the war, ULTRA’s value was
much less. Gardner also emphasizes that
there were lengthy periods when German
signals were being read only after considerable delay. For much of the war, he
concludes, ULTRA’s principal use was to
enable the Allies to build up a general
picture of the size and methods of the
German U-boat fleet. It seldom had any
impact on the Battle of the Atlantic at the
operational or tactical levels.
This book deliberately focuses on the
turning points of the campaign and the
broad relationship of ULTRA to other factors; it does not provide either a
blow-by-blow account of the Battle of the
Atlantic or a systematic examination of
ULTRA’s employment by Allied commanders. The period from June 1943 until the end of the war is largely ignored.
However, Gardner devotes a considerable
portion of this book to background
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information about the Battle of the Atlantic, including the importance of economic factors, the role of technology,
Germany’s own code-breaking activities,
and the workings of convoy. This material should be useful for the general
reader even if it offers little for the
specialist.
Gardner’s broad conclusions are carefully
reasoned and well balanced. The Battle of
the Atlantic would have been a harder
and costlier struggle without ULTRA, but
the Allied victory cannot be solely attributed to code-breaking successes. Decoding
History will not be the final word on signals intelligence and the Battle of the Atlantic, but it may put an end to the wildly
exaggerated claims that are sometimes
made for ULTRA.
CHRISTOPHER BELL

Naval War College

Reynolds, Leonard C. Dog Boats at War: Royal Navy D
Class MTBs and MGBs, 1939–1945. Gloucestershire,
U.K.: Sutton, 1998. 260pp. $35

There are few untold stories left from
World War II, but the actions of the
Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces can be described as little known and unappreciated. Serving in small plywood craft
much like the more famous American PT
boats, the Coastal Forces wreaked havoc
with Axis forces in British and foreign
waters. Operating from small harbors
and primitive forward bases, theirs was a
war of small, close-knit crews and close
action with the enemy. They did it all,
from convoy escort to shipping interdiction, clandestine landings to reconnaissance operations, and finally, distant
screening for invasion forces. Coastal
Forces were a ubiquitous presence in the
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